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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Citizen Support for the Welfare State:  
Determinants of Preferences for Income Redistribution 
 
by Philipp Rehm  
 
This paper explores the determinants of individual level support for income 
redistribution by the government. It argues that there are two sources of preference 
formation when it comes to redistribution. People are either in favor of income 
redistribution because they are disadvantaged, or they favor redistribution as a means to 
insure against income shocks. The paper explores both logics, but focuses on the latter. 
Four risk factors are hypothesizes to influence an individual’s preferences over income 
redistribution: a) structural change; b) exposure to international competition; c) 
specificity of skills; and d) occupational unemployment. Some of these measures are 
novel. The paper relies on the European Social Survey 2002/2003 in order to test the 
formulated hypotheses. The results show that a) skill specificity and occupational 
unemployment are important determinants of individual preferences over redistribution 
whereas b) structural change and exposure to international competition are not. 
 
 
Keywords: Public Opinion, Preferences, Redistribution, Varieties of Capitalism, Trade, 
Unemployment, Occupations 
JEL Classification: D31, D72, E24, H53 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Öffentliche Meinung und der Wohlfahrtsstaat: 
Bestimmungsgründe von Unterstützung für Einkommen-Umverteilung 
 
 
Diese Arbeit untersucht die Ursachen von Unterstützung für staatliche Einkommens-
Umverteilung, auf der individuellen Ebene. Es wird argumentiert dass es zwei Quellen 
für Präferenzen für Umverteilung gibt. Man ist entweder für Einkommens-
Umverteilung weil man benachteiligt ist. Oder man ist dafür, weil Umverteilung als 
Versicherung gegen bestimmte Einkommens-Fluktuationen dient. Die Arbeit untersucht 
beide Quellen, konzentriert sich aber auf die Logik von Umverteilung als Risiko-
Absicherung. Es werden vier Risiko-Faktoren vorgeschlagen, die einen Einfluss auf 
individuelle Präferenzen für Einkommens-Umverteilung einen Einfluss haben könnten: 
a) struktureller Wandel; b) internationale Konkurrenz; c) spezialisiertes Humankapital 
und d) Arbeitslosigkeit innerhalb von Berufsgruppen. Einige dieser Faktoren werden in 
neuartiger Weise operationalisiert. Um die formulierten Hypothesen zu testen, benutzt 
die Arbeit das ‚European Social Survey 2002/2003’. Die Resultate ergeben dass a) 
spezialisiertes Humankapital und Arbeitslosigkeit innerhalb von Berufsgruppen 
wichtige Ursachen für Präferenzen für Umverteilung sind. Hingegen können b) 
struktureller Wandel und internationale Konkurrenz nicht als wichtige Faktoren für 
Präferenzen hinsichtlich von Einkommens-Umverteilung etabliert werden. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main question of this paper is: What determines individual level support for 
income redistribution by the government?1 This question is important for at least 
two reasons. To begin, redistribution is a central activity of all governments in 
Western democracies. All OECD countries redistribute substantial parts of their 
gross national products. Second, redistributional questions are one of the most 
contested issues in democracies. People align with and vote for parties because of 
their different degrees of support for income redistribution. Party competition in 
most democracies is heavily influenced by competing positions on redistributional 
issues. Indeed, redistributional preferences are the single best predictor of partisan 
preferences (Kitschelt & Rehm 2004a). In addition, from a normative perspective it 
seems desirable to have programmatic linkages between the electorate and parties. 
Politicians, according to this argument, should supply policies that are demanded by 
voters.2 But in order to assess whether these linkages exist, we obviously need to 
know the demand-side: what do voters want? And what determines these 
preferences? 
 
Despite the importance of redistribution as government activity and for party 
competition, there is little systematic – and above all little comparative empirical – 
research on the determinants of individual preferences. Given the amount of 
research devoted to models that rely heavily upon associations between individual 
characteristics and preferences (e.g. the literature on trade, on welfare states, on 
social stratification) this is puzzling.3 
 
In order to explore the determinants of support for redistribution, this paper 
relies on public opinion surveys. Public opinion data are plagued by a variety of 
problems (see, e.g., Converse 1962, 1964; Page & Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; 
                                                 
1 This paper benefited from comments from and / or joint work with John Aldrich, Thomas Cusack, 
Lutz Engelhardt, Torben Iversen, Robert Keohane, Herbert Kitschelt, Moira Nelson, and David 
Soskice. I am very grateful for their – at times substantial – input. Remaining mistakes are mine. 
2 On the relationship between public opinion and public policy, see Papadakis 1992. 
3 One reason for this somewhat embarrassing lack of systematic comparative attitudinal research is 
the general scepticism toward public opinion research in political science (more on that below). 
Another reason is the overwhelming trend in political science to focus on institutions, not on tastes 
(Riker 1980). 
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Hiscox 2003). While these problems should be kept in mind when drawing 
conclusions, there are also good reasons for the position that mass surveys do allow 
for meaningful causal inferences. For example, survey research replicates certain 
findings over and over again. Were survey answers merely statements drawn from 
“the top of the respondents’ head” (Zaller 1992) and had no systematic component 
to them, this should not be the case. In addition, democracies are organized around 
the exact principle of meaningful preference articulation. However, this paper’s 
premise – that comparative attitudinal research allows for meaningful causal 
inference – does not mean that there is a “grand theory” of social preference 
formation. In contrast, it is argued below that individual preferences are influenced 
by a variety of determinants. 
 
In order to identify some of the determinants of support for income 
redistribution and assess their empirical utility, this paper proceeds as follows. In 
the next section, two logics of individual support for income redistribution are 
presented. The first logic – ‘desire for equity’ – assumes that people are in favor of 
income redistribution because they are disadvantaged. The second logic – ‘desire 
for redistribution’ – assumes that people are in favor of income redistribution 
because they want to insure themselves against certain risks that threaten their 
income stream. This framework is used to generate hypotheses about determinants 
of individual support for redistribution. The paper suggests a variety of new 
indicators measuring risk exposure at the individual level. The results are presented 
in section 3, and section 4 concludes. Details on the data can be found in the 
appendix. 
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2. Theory & Hypotheses 
 
Support for income redistribution at the individual level is the object of interest 
in this study. The theoretical perspective that frames this paper suggests that two 
logics influence preference over income redistribution. The first logic – ‘desire for 
equity’ – comes in two forms. On the one hand, individuals may be in favor of 
income redistribution because they – selflessly – think this is a just principle. 
People’s opinions, in this view, are “grounded in beliefs and values” (Peillon 1996: 
178). On the other hand, individuals could be in favor of income redistribution 
because they – selfishly – see themselves as disadvantaged. This is the logic 
suggested by the famous Meltzer & Richard (1981) model as well as in the power 
resource theory (Esping-Andersen 1985). Lack of data precludes dealing with the 
selfless version of the ‘desire for equity’ logic of preference formation.4 Instead, 
this paper will deal with the selfish kind of ‘desire for equity’ (redistribution for 
equity). From this perspective, the most important determinant of preferences over 
income redistribution is income: in a democracy, the maximum the disadvantaged 
can achieve is equity. Disadvantaged individuals, i.e. poor people, are in favor of 
income redistribution because they hope to gain from it. 
 
The second logic of the formation of preferences over redistribution is a ‘desire 
for insurance.’ Individuals support income redistribution because it helps them to 
absorb income shocks and keep a certain minimum level of income even in bad 
times. They want to smooth their income over their life cycle. This perspective was 
most prominently formulated by Hal Varian. Under the assumption that future 
income is not completely certain5 he shows that “the motive for redistribution […] 
is not a desire for equity per se, but rather a desire for social insurance” (Varian 
                                                 
4 Indeed, studies have shown that, at least some of the time, “empirical beliefs about justice appear 
to be self-interested” (Hegtvedt 1992: 325). But see Peillon (1996). 
5 More concretely, an individual’s actual income consists of his expected income plus a random 
error term (that is assumed to be uncorrelated between individuals). Under these conditions, “there is 
a clear economic case for the establishment of an insurance market which could eliminate individual 
risk” (Varian 1980: 51). However, it is not clear that insurance will be provided by a market. In 
contrast, many of the risks discussed in this paper are not insurable in the private market and, hence, 
need to be insured by the state. 
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1980: 51, italics in original).6 Or, as Hans-Werner Sinn put it: “From an allocative 
point of view, the main advantage of the welfare state is the insurance or risk 
reducing function of redistributive taxation. […] [G]overnments take more taxes 
from the rich than from the poor, thus reducing the variance in real lifetime 
incomes. […] Redistributive taxation and insurance are two sides of the same coin” 
(Sinn 1995: 495-496).7 Redistribution, in other words, is desirable because it 
smoothes the income stream of individuals and shares the risk of income shocks 
across society.8 
 
One can take the position that the two suggested logics of the formation of 
redistributional preferences are mutually exclusive. People either make up their 
mind relying on the calculus of equity or they form their opinions on income 
redistribution relying on the calculus of insurance. However, here it is argued that a 
synthetic view makes much more sense. Both logics of preference formation are 
important, and they are not mutually exclusive.9 Consequently, this paper 
hypothesizes that both logics influence preferences over income redistribution. 
However, the main focus is on the redistribution-as-insurance argument. 
 
As was argued above, income arises as the most important determinant of the 
redistribution for equity logic.10 The paper explicitly controls for this logic in the 
estimated models. Hypotheses that can be derived from the redistribution-as-
                                                 
6 This perspective is also elegantly formulated in John Rawls’ ‘theory of justice’ (Rawls 1971). 
When individuals have to decide behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. they are uncertain about their 
societal position, they opt for policies that support the least well-off. 
7 See also Andersen (2002), Arachi & D’Antoni (2003). 
8 By providing insurance, redistribution also facilitates certain types of desirable investments, 
usually into human capital (see Iversen & Soskice 2001). 
9 It may well be that these sources historically differed in their importance. One can argue that the 
redistribution for equity desire used to be – but is not anymore – more important than the 
redistribution-as-insurance desire. An explanation for the shift could be that societal demands 
changed because of an increase in individual (and societal) wealth. This is a similar mechanism as 
suggested by Wagner’s law or in Ronald Inglehart’s work. According to Ingelhart’s “scarcity 
hypothesis”, individuals have “need hierarchies” that influence their attitudes. According to his 
“socialization hypothesis”, changes in need hierarchies occur slowly (Inglehart 1981: 881). 
Similarly, behavioral economists, most famously Kahneman & Tversky (1979), consistently show 
that individuals change their perceptions (of gains and losses), depending on their reference point. It 
could well be that individuals nowadays primarily form their preferences according to the 
redistribution-as-insurance desire because the equity-desire is – at least in most countries analyzed in 
this paper – reasonably well met. 
10 The sociological literature suggests class or income as determinants; often, the former (class) is 
measured by the latter (income). See d’Anjou & Steijn & van Aarsen (1995: 357). Because it has 
been done elsewhere (Rehm 2004b), this paper does not deal with the class concept. 
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insurance logic are presented below. Although it is theoretically well developed, the 
redistribution-as-insurance argument has not been tested in detail at the individual 
level.11 This is what this paper is about: to find out whether the insurance logic 
plays a substantive role in the formation of individual preferences over 
redistribution – even when controlling for the well established redistribution as 
equity logic. 
 
2.1. Dependent Variable 
In order to test the empirical utility of the redistribution-as-insurance 
argument, this paper’s dependent variable is “support for income redistribution”, or, 
simply put, redistributional preferences. More concretely, people were asked the 
following question:12 
“Please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” 
 
The five possible answer categories and their frequencies are shown in the 
graph below. The scale goes from 1 (“agree strongly”) to 5 (“disagree strongly”). 
The (weighted or unweighted) mean of the measure is 3.75 (with a standard 
deviation of roughly 1), i.e. more respondents are in agreement with the statement 
than in disagreement.13 
                                                 
11 There are a few exceptions, such as Iversen & Soskice 2001. A “sociological version” has been 
tested by Taylor-Gooby et al. 1999. 
12 In this paper, the European Social Survey [ESS] 2002/2003 is employed; for details, see below. 
13 Means, standard deviations and number of observations for each country are listed in the appendix 
in table 3. 
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Government should reduce differences in income levels 
14 %
13.4 %
24.9 %
44.9 %
2.7 %
0 10 20 30 40 50
Disagree strongly
Disagree
Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Agree strongly
N=32,234.
Data weighted 
Percentages
 
The following table shows the mean, standard deviation and number of observation 
of the dependent variable for each country in the sample. 
‘Government should reduce differences in income levels’ 
Country Weighted Mean (sorting variable) Standard Deviation 
Number of 
Observations 
Denmark  2.98 1.16 1,403 
West Germany  3.16 1.09 1,736 
Netherlands  3.39 1.05 2,340 
United Kingdom  3.48 1.02 2,022 
Switzerland  3.52 1.04 2,005 
Luxembourg  3.59 1.19 1,444 
Sweden  3.67 0.93 1,947 
Norway  3.71 0.93 2,030 
Belgium  3.73 1.06 1,861 
Austria  3.74 1.11 2,136 
    
All countries 3.75 1.06 32,234 
    
Ireland  3.80 0.91 1,977 
East Germany  3.87 0.95 1,140 
Finland  4.00 1.04 1,973 
Spain  4.02 0.86 1,606 
Italy  4.04 0.93 1,166 
France  4.16 1.03 1,489 
Greece  4.32 0.75 2,500 
Portugal  4.33 0.69 1,459 
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Since the interpretation of the estimation-results is significantly facilitated 
by a binary operationalization of the dependent variable, usually a transformed 
variable is employed.14 Its distribution is shown in the following graph: 
Government should reduce differences in income levels 
69.8 %
30.2 %
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Disagree strongly /
Disagree / Neither
agree nor disagree
Agree / Agree
strongly
N=32,234.
Data weighted 
Percentages
 The ultimate test for the quality of a dependent variable is whether it fits the 
underlying concept well. As is typical in the survey literature, the above mentioned 
question is not perfect. On the positive side, the question is broad enough to cover 
the redistribution for equity and the redistribution-as-insurance dimension: 
“Measures to reduce differences in income levels” can include mere Robin-Hood-
style redistribution (taking from the rich and giving to the poor) as well as more 
subtle redistributional arrangements that insure against certain risks. In addition, the 
question is parsimonious in terms of the stimuli it provokes.15 Since citizens 
typically hold competing values, “the considerations they care about can come into 
conflict in particular situations” (Sniderman & Brody & Tetlock 1991: 52). Framing 
a question in a certain way can establish the salience of one consideration over the 
other. In particular, the question does not remind respondents that “measures to 
reduce differences in income levels” result in higher taxes. This avoids a ‘taxation 
                                                 
14 For robustness tests, sometimes the original five-point measure is employed. 
15 The argument goes parallel to John Zaller’s (1992) theory of how people make up their answers to 
survey questions. There, two-sided information flows provide more than one stimulus. It is very 
tricky to deal with this phenomenon because “dominant and countervalent messages can have 
different effects in different segments of the population, depending on citizens’ political awareness 
and ideological orientations and on the relative intensities of the two messages” (1992: 185). 
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stimulus’ – unlike the question wording on similar issues in other surveys.16 This 
could also explain why the overall support for redistribution is so high. On the 
negative side, the question’s parsimony is also problematic. Obviously, it would be 
desirable to have several and very detailed questions asking about different aspects 
of redistribution, in particular about the insurance aspect of redistribution.17 In 
addition, it is not clear how the status quo comes into the picture. Does the question 
ask for a general opinion (à la ‘in general, do you think governments should take 
measures…’) or a very specific opinion (à la ‘given the status quo in your country, 
should the government take more or less measures…’). Taken together, the above 
mentioned question is of reasonable quality.18 
 
2.2. Independent Variables 
This paper’s main focus is on the empirical utility of the redistribution-as-
insurance argument, controlling for the redistribution for equity logic. Taking 
existing political-economy theories as the starting point, the paper derives several 
hypotheses about the impact of certain risk factors on individual preferences over 
redistribution. These factors center on the risk of losing income as a consequence of 
adverse labor market dynamics. First, variables related to this argument are 
discussed. Then, the control variables are presented. 
 
2.2.1. Risk of unemployment 
One implication of the redistribution-as-insurance logic is the following 
causal mechanism: For most people, employment is the main source of income (see 
Beramendi & Cusack 2004 for comparable numbers on the importance of wages for 
the personal disposable income). The most direct threat to this primary source of 
income is losing one’s job. In the spirit of understanding redistribution as a means 
to insure against risks, the risk of unemployment should influence preferences over 
redistribution. Ceteris paribus, the higher the risk of unemployment, the more an 
individual favors redistribution. The risk of unemployment is a function of many 
                                                 
16 For example, it would be much more difficult to argue that the following hypothetical question 
covers both sources of preference formation: “Are you in favor of taking income from the rich and 
giving it to the poor?” 
17 Unfortunately, no international survey exists that has these detailed policy questions and the 
necessary key independent variables at the same time. 
18 Especially since the country fixed-effects in the estimations control for systematic biases across 
countries and since there is no reason to believe that there other non-random patterns in the data. 
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factors, and it is difficult to measure. This paper relies on existing political 
economy theories to identify some factors that are likely to influence the risk of 
unemployment. In particular, the following conditions are argued to increase the 
risk of unemployment: unfavorable structural change, international 
incompetitiveness, specific skills, and employment in occupations with unfavorable 
futures. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
 
Structural change 
Labor markets are dynamic. Certain industries prosper, while others decline. 
For example, the service sector grew, whereas the agricultural and industrial sectors 
declined in most countries over the last decades. Following the logic that 
individuals demand social policy to insure against risks, it is hypothesized that 
one’s employment risk influences one’s preferences over redistribution: 
Individuals employed in industries (sectors) that suffer from job-losses are 
over-proportionally in favor of redistribution. 
 
In order to judge the impact of structural change on individual preferences, we need 
a fine-grained measure of structural change that does not lump together different 
sectors19 and their development. The risk of unemployment brought by structural 
change should be measured by looking at employment dynamics at a detailed 
sectoral level. Therefore, this paper uses a variable from the European Social 
Survey [ESS] that contains detailed information on sectoral employment (in the 
NACE Revision 1 classification, 2-digit).20 At this level of detail, the classification 
distinguishes 60 different industries.21 EU labor force data containing information 
on the employment dynamics of these 60 different sectors are merged into the data-
set, differentiating by gender. The resulting measure of structural change has up to 
120 different values, for each country, for various years.22 
 
                                                 
19 Sector and industry are used interchangeably. 
20 The “Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE, 
Revision 1)” can be found here: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL_L
INEAR&IntCurrentPage=1&StrNom=NACE_1_1&StrLanguageCode=EN. 
21 For example, NACE 2-digit code 30 stands for “manufacture of office machinery and computers”, 
whereas code 70 is assigned to people that are involved in “real estate activities.” 
22 Please see the appendix for details. 
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International competition 
The literature on international competition and its potential effect on 
(un)employment and individual preferences is vast and detailed. The comparative 
political economy as well as the international political economy literature relies on 
arguments that connect an individual’s sectoral employment with her preferences. 
Theoretically, this link has been developed in some detail, especially in the trade 
literature. For example, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem – or variants thereof – 
predicts that people employed in a sector enjoying a comparative advantage will 
have systematically different preferences than those in sectors with comparative 
disadvantage or in non-tradable sectors (Frieden 1991: 451; Mayda & Rodrik 
2002). A somewhat comparable logic has been brought forward in the welfare state 
literature. There, the stylized fact that small, export-dependent countries tend to 
have large welfare states has been explained with the so-called compensation 
hypothesis (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985: 47-57; Rodrik 1998). The proposed 
logic is that exposure to international competition increases workers’ insecurity, for 
which they are compensated with generous social security benefits.23 Although the 
compensation hypothesis is usually applied to macro-units, namely countries, it has 
to have a micro-logic – in some accounts this is made explicit: “[.] if the 
government acts as the agent of households that dislike risk, it will choose to 
consume a greater share of the society’s resources in economies that are subject to 
greater amount of external risk” (Rodrik 1998: 1011).24 Relatedly, the literature on 
welfare state retrenchment suggests that intensified international competition leads 
to political conflicts between workers and employers in the exposed sectors on the 
one hand and those in sheltered (usually public) sectors on the other hand: “workers 
and employers in exposed sectors become acutely concerned with containing the 
upward pressure on domestic costs generated by large public sectors. In this context 
a new political-economic cleavage between sheltered and exposed sectors opens up 
                                                 
23 Note that this argument rests on the assumption that increased trade exposure actually increases 
risks (see Manow 1999). 
24 Although Rodrik refers in this quote to government consumption, he explicitly states that the 
equivalent insurance function in OECD countries is usually provided by “the establishment of a 
safety net” because they “do have the administrative capacity to manage social welfare systems” 
(Rodrik 1998: 1012). 
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and the exposed sector coalition exerts increasing pressure for public sector reform” 
(Clayton & Pontusson 1998: 97).25 
Although these theories rely on causal mechanisms at the individual level, 
and despite their importance, they have hardly been tested at the micro-level.26 This 
paper offers tests of some of these arguments. In particular, the following 
hypotheses are derived from the above mentioned arguments and tested below: 
Individuals employed in sectors that are exposed to international markets 
(i.e. trade) hold different preferences than people in sectors that are not 
exposed to trade. More concretely, individuals employed in sectors that 
enjoy a comparative advantage are less in favor of redistribution than 
individuals in the non-tradable sector or sectors that suffer from a 
comparative disadvantage. 
 
For testing these hypotheses, the survey variable that contains sectoral employment 
information at NACE (2-digit level) can be employed again. Information about a 
sector’s exposure to trade (tradable sector or not) are merged into the data-set. If a 
sector does trade, its comparative advantage or disadvantage is computed, using 
OECD’s “International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS).”27 
 
Specific Skills 
Torben Iversen & David Soskice (2001) propose to consider the ‘skill 
specificity’ as an important variable that determines individual preferences over 
redistributive policies (see also Estevez-Abe & Iversen & Soskice 2001; Moene & 
Wallerstein 2001). In their seminal article “An Asset Theory of Social Policy 
Preferences”, they develop an explanation for preferences over redistribution that 
emphasizes the composition of individuals’ skills. The crucial causal mechanism 
that they propose is that individuals who have made risky investments (i.e. 
investments in specific skills) “will demand insurance against the possible future 
loss of income from those investments” (Iversen & Soskice 2001: 875). The 
assumption underlying this logic is that acquired human skills can be understood as 
investment (Becker 1964). In following Williamson’s transaction cost theory 
                                                 
25 This ‘cleavage’ has been identified before: “Confronted with the cleavage between externally 
oriented and domestically oriented economic sectors, the small European states have developed 
corporatist structures that enhance political predictability by facilitating cooperation and 
compromise“ (Katzenstein 1985: 96). See also Rieger & Leibfried (1998). 
26 Only very recently, the trade literature turned to empirical investigations of the underlying micro-
logic of its theories (see Mayda & Rodrik 2002; O’Rourke & Sinnott 2001; Scheve & Slaugther 
2001), with mixed results. 
27 Please see the appendix for details. 
 12
(1985), Iversen & Soskice (2001) argue that non-market institutions such as 
redistribution can overcome market failures such as under-investment in specific 
skills. In terms of human capital, market failure would prevent investment in 
specific skills because individuals with specific skills could not market them 
elsewhere. This exposure to risk “is inversely related to the portability of skills” 
(Iversen & Soskice 2001: 875). More concretely, general skills are marketable 
within the whole economy whereas specific skills are marketable only in one sector 
(Iversen & Soskice 2001: 875). 
 
Their model’s most general and key testable implication is that “workers 
with specific skills will prefer higher taxes and social protection than workers with 
general skills”, or, to put it even differently: “skill specificity increases the demand 
for social protection” (Iversen & Soskice 2001: 879, 880). This is the next 
hypothesis: 
 Individuals with more specific skills demand more redistributional policies. 
 
For testing this hypothesis, the paper relies on a similar operationalization as 
proposed in the original article (Iversen & Soskice 2001: 881-883). For reasons of 
data-reliability, there is one difference: what is called “the size of the labor market 
segment” of each occupation (p. 881) is not measured within the survey itself but 
with EU labor force data (as the mean of all countries used in the analyses, 1997-
2002).28 
 
Disadvantaged occupations 
Some occupations appear to be particularly exposed to the changing 
vagaries of dynamic labor markets. People in these occupations should be 
especially worried about their jobs. This is the next hypothesis: 
Individuals in disadvantaged occupations (i.e. occupations with high 
unemployment rates) are more in favor of redistribution than individuals in 
advantaged occupations (i.e. occupations with low unemployment rates). 
 
This is the most direct test of the redistribution-as-insurance argument in this paper: 
the link between occupational unemployment and the assumed causal mechanism 
(risk of unemployment influences redistributive preferences) is close. In order to 
                                                 
28 Please see the appendix for details. 
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test the hypothesis, occupational unemployment rates were merged with a survey 
variable that contains detailed occupational information. As a result, the study 
employs unemployment rates at the 3-digit level of the “International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (ISCO88)” classification, exploiting EU labor force 
survey data. There are up to 108 unemployment rates per country.29 
 
2.2.2. Control Variables 
In order to investigate the empirical performance of the determinants of 
individual preferences over redistribution, it is important to carefully consider other 
factors that potentially influence these preferences. Unless there are good reasons 
not to, the following standard control variables are included in the estimations: 
 
Income 
Income is the variable that controls for the redistribution-as-equity 
argument: the wording of the question used as dependent variable suggests that 
redistribution is progressive30 (“Please say to what extent you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: The government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels”). As argued above, this reasoning is in line with the 
widely used Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer & Richard 1981). There, voters with 
incomes above the mean income will demand less redistribution than voters with 
incomes below the mean (this hypothesis will be tested in passing). In addition, 
income is an important control variable because it influences the ability of 
individuals to insure themselves against fluctuations of their income stream, for 
example by saving. Rich individuals do not need the insurance provided by 
redistribution, because they can insure themselves.31  
 
Age 
Age may influence preferences over redistribution in several ways. To begin 
with, older people tend to be more dependent on health insurance and pensions. In 
                                                 
29 For the analyses, ISCO88 2-digit category “11” (legislators and senior officials) was usually 
excluded because the data-quality for this very small group is low. The results are not affected by 
this in any way. Please see the appendix for details. 
30 However, it is not a priori true that the rich pay the bill for the welfare state. For example, Lindert 
(2004) argues that different social policies have very different distributional logics. Big welfare 
states tend to be financed by a variety of taxes. Huge revenues are derived from value added taxes 
(VATs), which are not progressive. 
31 Even if they do not pay an over-proportional share of the burden, their ability to insure themselves 
may be reduced by state intervention, because the disposable income is reduced. 
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most countries within the sample, these are financed by state-funded, redistributive 
schemes. Secondly, “older workers are likely to be more concerned with job 
security and income than younger workers” (Iversen & Soskice 2001: 883), because 
they are less likely to find another job should they lose their present one. 
 
Gender 
That there are systematic attitudinal differences between women and men is 
a very consistent and badly understood phenomenon. With regard to redistributional 
preferences, a potential explanation that stresses the importance of the labor market 
could argue that women have to move into and out of the labor market more often 
than men. This is so mainly because women still shoulder the major burden of child 
rearing and care of frail parents. In addition, women’s jobs are over-proportionally 
dependent on the welfare state itself (i.e., they hold an over-proportional share of 
public sector service jobs). As a final reason, one can argue that women’s higher 
life expectancy gives them more favorable preferences for redistributive schemes 
(pensions, health care, etc.).  
 
Education 
Education is a somewhat problematic control variable. Sometimes, it will be 
excluded because it covaries with some of the key independent variables. The risk 
of occupational unemployment, for example, negatively correlates with education. 
The operationalization of skill specificity, as another example, explicitly controls 
for education. Nevertheless, education influences life-chances and income 
opportunities and, therefore, qualifies as an important control variable.  
 
Self-employment 
The self-employed often employ others. That means that they depend on 
“flexible labor markets and often on relatively low-paid workers.” One could 
expect, then, that they are in favor of “free markets and a low level of social 
protection” (Iversen & Soskice 2001: 883). Therefore, the self-employed are 
expected to be less supportive of income redistribution than individuals who are not 
self-employed. 
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Union membership 
Since unions are meant to provide insurance against risks related to the 
workplace, including redistributional policies, controlling for union membership is 
necessary. In addition, it can be shown that union members self-select into union 
because they hold strong social-protectionist views (Kitschelt & Rehm 2004a). 
 
Unemployed 
Straightforwardly, the unemployed are expected to support high levels of 
redistribution, because they depend on transfers. 
 
These control variables are very common in comparative attitudinal research.32 
 
3. Data & Results 
3.1. Data 
The data-set employed in this paper is the European Social Survey [ESS] 
2002/200333 (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team 2002/2003). The ESS is funded 
jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and 
scientific funding bodies in each of the 22 participating country. The ESS is the 
only cross-country survey that has comparable variables on industry employment 
and occupation, which is necessary for testing the hypotheses formulated above. In 
                                                 
32 Of course, the list of control variables could be extended. In what follows, some relatively 
common control variables that are not included in this study are briefly discussed. 
• Transfer dependence 
Individuals relying on state transfers are, obviously, expected to be supportive of these transfer 
schemes and, hence, redistribution. But since this feedback-loop argument – prominently put 
forward by Paul Pierson (1994, 1996) – turns out not to be important (see below), transfer 
dependence will not be a standard control variable.  
• Nonemployed, part-time employed 
These variables have been included, for example, in Iversen & Soskice (2001). Two reasons speak 
against including them as standard control variables. First, the categories of the nonemployed and 
part-time employed are very heterogeneous. People are for very different reasons not employed, and 
they work for very different reasons only part-time. Second, these variables empirically turn out not 
to be important. 
• Left-right position 
Unfortunately, it is quite common to include left-right self-placement (or similar party affiliation 
variables) as independent variables in models predicting preferences. While this may make sense 
under very restrictive circumstances, generally it does not. These variables are almost certainly 
endogenous: being left or right means supporting redistribution or not (Kitschelt & Rehm 2004a). In 
addition, it is usually trivial to predict attitudes (e.g. redistribution) with other attitudes (such as left-
right self-placement) – of course they covary! 
33 The fieldwork was carried out between September 2002 and December 2003, but on average 
within four months in each country. 
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terms of quality, the ESS is the best available cross-country survey that has ever 
been published. 
 
Data on the following 17 countries are analyzed: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (East and West separately), Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. There are two reasons for excluding the 
Czech Republic, Israel, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. On the one hand, most data 
that are merged into the survey are not available for these countries. On the other 
hand, it is reasonable to select countries that are at least roughly comparable and, 
therefore, meet basic unit homogeneity assumptions. Unlike the 17 selected 
countries, the five excluded countries cannot be counted as advanced capitalist 
democracies. 
 
3.2. Estimation Strategy 
A series of probit models are estimated, based on the following general 
model:34 
Preferences for redistribution εβββ +++= ∑
=
I
i
iIV
2
10 *  
where “IV” is the independent variable of interest – they vary across the models – 
and βi (i=2, 3, …, I) are the coefficients for control variables, including country 
dummies. The residuals, ε, are assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed. This is a standard specification for models using survey data. For all 
estimations, data are weighted.35 All equations have been estimated with STATA 8. 
 
3.3. Results36 
In interpreting the results, the focus will be on three characteristics of the 
estimated coefficients: their statistical significance, their substantive effect, and 
their robustness. Statistical significance asks whether the estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant from zero, at usual statistical significance levels. 
                                                 
34 For robustness, models are sometimes estimated as ordered probit and probit models. 
35 Following the ESS documentation, the design weight (correcting for the probability of being 
selected, variable “dweight”) is multiplied with the population weight (adjusting the sample size to 
the country size, variable “pweight”). For estimations involving only one country, only design 
weights are employed. 
36 To economize on space, country dummies are neither shown nor discussed. 
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Considering a coefficient’s substantive effect is the best way to get a sense of a 
variable’s effect on a categorical dependent variable.37 In order to evaluate the 
substantive effect of the variables, this paper heavily relies on simulations. 
Simulations reveal the impact of one variable on the dependent variable, holding 
everything else constant. For example, simulations can show how the dependent 
variable (i.e. preferences over income redistribution) of a hypothetical individual 
changes when one increases this individual’s education. Equivalently, one can think 
about simulations in the following way: how are the preferences different from two 
individuals that are identical but differ on the variable of interest? Therefore, 
simulations help to visualize and evaluate the impact of the independent variable of 
interest on the dependent variable. This impact is called the variable’s substantive 
effect. Finally, the paper considers the robustness of coefficients. It is impossible to 
define a clear decision rule for a coefficient’s robustness. Here, coefficients are said 
to be robust if they are statistically significant in a variety of models. Models can 
differ, for example, in their specifications,38 on the sample they are tested,39 and in 
the way variables are operationalized.40 Details can be found in the appendix. 
Although there are neither clear rules for what constitutes a meaningful ‘substantive 
effect’ nor what can be seen as a ‘robust’ relationship, this paper discusses these 
concepts. Considering the three characteristics – statistical significance, substantive 
effect, and robustness – should increase the reliability of the results.  
 
3.3.1. Baseline Model 
Table 1 shows the results of the baseline-model, i.e., the regression model 
with the control variables alone and no variables of substantive interest. By and 
large, except for the coefficient on age the results are in line with the expectations. 
All theorized coefficients are significant, point in the right direction and, as will be 
shown shortly, have a non-negligible substantive effect. This pattern holds for the 
ordered probit as well as the probit estimation results (table 1, models 1 and 2). 
                                                 
37 For many of the substantive effects simulations, the software SPost (Long & Freese 2002) is used. 
38 For example, by excluding control variables. 
39 For example, by excluding one country at a time (Jackknife tests). 
40 For example, the occupational unemployment variable is measured at different time points and at 
different levels of detail. Each of these variables (and averages thereof) are estimated. 
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 When using categorical dependent variables it is even more difficult than in 
models with continuous dependent variables to evaluate the overall fit of the estimated 
model. The table provides “Pseudo-R2‘s” for every reported estimation as well as Wald 
statistics. The latter allows for testing the hypothesis that all coefficients except the 
intercept are zero (this hypothesis is rejected in all models). As a third possibility, the 
percentage of correctly predicted observations (PCP) for the baseline model shall be 
presented. Although this measure suffers from various problems (see Hagle & Mitchell 
II 1992; Herron 1999), it is nevertheless displayed in the following table.41 As can be 
seen from the table, the baseline-model predicts 72.2% of the observations correctly.42 
Correctly and incorrectly predicted observations 
 Observed  
Predicted 0 1 Total 
0 1,555 (6.1 %) 
1,103 
(4.3 %) 2,658 
1 5,977 (23.5 %) 
16,833 
(66.1 %) 22,810 
Total 7,532 17,936 25,468 
    
Percent correctly predicted: 72.2 % 
Modal category: 70.4 % 
Note: based on model 2 (table 1) 
 
The following graphs show the substantive effect of all significant control 
variables in the baseline-model (table 1, model 2). The combination of variables shown 
in the graphs neither follows a particular logic nor changes the findings in any way. 
Showing the simulated substantive effects of two variables at the same time simply 
economizes on space. The first graph shows the substantive effect of income on 
preferences over redistribution, by gender.43 More concretely, the graph visualizes the 
effect of income on support for redistribution by means of two lines: one for women 
                                                 
41 The cut-off point was set at 0.5. 
42 It is difficult to evaluate whether this qualifies as a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ model, but the table shows that 
the model is at least more successful than a simplistic model that trivially predicts that all observations 
will be a one. By design, such a model correctly predicts all observed ones in the data-set (here: 70.4%; 
see “modal category” in the table). The “reduction in error”, i.e. the proportion of correct guesses beyond 
the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the modal category, is 6.1 % (see Long & 
Freese 2001: 86, where the measure is called “adjusted count R²”, for the formula). 
43 Unless otherwise noted, for the simulations all continuous variables are set to their (unweighted) mean 
and all dummy variables to zero. 
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(the dashed line), the other one for men. As can be seen from the graph, there is a 
gender gap: women are generally more in favor of redistribution (regardless of the 
income level). As can be read from the distance between the two lines, women’s 
probability of agreeing or strongly agreeing with redistribution is around 6% higher 
than the probability for men. For example, the probability that an “average man”44 is in 
favor of income redistribution is around 73%. The same value for an “average 
woman”, then, is six percentage points higher, i.e. 79%. The graph also shows that 
income has a huge substantive effect. Hypothetically changing the income level of an 
“average individual” from lowest (=1) to highest (=12) decreases this individual’s 
probability of being in favor of income redistribution by roughly 20%. For example, 
the probability of being in support for redistribution for a man with lowest income is 
around 82%. The probability of the same hypothetical man drops to around 62% when 
one simulates a change in income to the highest income level. 
 
GRAPH 1: Substantive effect of income on preference for redistribution, by gender 
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44 The “average man” has mean income, age, and educational level, is dependent employed, not 
unemployed, and not a union member. He comes from no country. 
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Likewise, education plays an important role in shaping preferences over income 
redistribution (see graph 2). Changing educational level from lowest (0) to highest (6) 
decreases the probability of being in favor of income redistribution by roughly 20%. 
As can be also seen from graph 2, self-employed individuals are less in favor of income 
redistribution than people who are not self-employed. The distance between the dotted 
and the solid line indicates that the probability of being in favor of redistribution of a 
person not self-employed is almost 8% higher than the probability of a self-employed 
individual. 
 
GRAPH 2: Substantive effect of education on preference for redistribution, by self-
employment 
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The third graph shows the simulation for unemployment and union membership. 
On the left side of the graph, on can see that being unemployed increases an 
individual’s probability of agreeing with redistribution from 73% to above 80%. The 
substantive effect of union membership is smaller. As can be read from the two bars at 
the right side of graph 3, union membership increases the probability of being in favor 
of income redistribution by around 5%.  
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GRAPH 3: Substantive effect of union membership and unemployment on preference 
for redistribution 
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Before turning to the independent variables of most interest in this paper, 
results for two other hypotheses that have been tested are presented. 
 
Meltzer & Richard 
Recall the key result of Meltzer & Richard’s (1981) influential model: 
individuals with incomes above the national mean are not in favor of income 
redistribution while individuals below the mean income are. In order to test this 
proposition, the income variable had to be dropped from the estimation and replaced 
with a dummy variable indicating whether an individual’s income was above or below 
the national mean income.45 It turns out that Meltzer & Richard’s (1981) expectation 
has empirical support at the micro-level: “rich” individuals (i.e. individuals with above-
mean income) are significantly less likely to support redistribution (table 1, model 3). 
                                                 
45 Since the income variable and the dummy variable just mentioned are so closely related (their 
correlation coefficient is around 0.67, which is extremely high for a large-N survey data-set), they cannot 
be left in the same model. Otherwise, the standard errors would suffer from multi-collinearity. 
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The substantive effect, however, is relatively modest, at least compared to the effect of 
income. Graph 4 shows that the simulated probability of being in favor of 
redistribution of “rich” individuals is around 6.5% lower than the probability of “poor” 
individuals (see graph 4, left side). 
 
GRAPH 4: Substantive effect of (above or below mean) income and transfer 
dependence on preference for redistribution 
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Transfer dependence 
As was mentioned above, it has been argued that individuals who’s main 
income source are government transfers can be expected to be in favor of 
redistribution. This transfer dependency hypothesis was tested in passing (table 1, 
model 4). Again, income has to be excluded from the estimation because income and 
transfer dependence highly correlate with each other (people who receive transfers tend 
to be poor).46 The statistical performance of the transfer variable is weak: although it is 
statistically significant in the estimation reported in table 1, model 4, the relationship is 
not very robust. Estimating the model with slightly different operationalizations of the  
                                                 
46 The correlation coefficient is -0.38. 
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very same concept does not lead to a significant coefficient. In addition, the substantive 
effect of the reported coefficient is rather small. The two bars on the right side of graph 
4 show that receiving transfers increases ones probability of being in favor of income 
redistribution by a mere 3.5%. 
 
For the purpose of this paper, the performance of the independent variables 
affecting or measuring the risk of unemployment is more interesting. The results are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
 
3.3.2. Risk of unemployment 
Structural change 
The structural change variable captures whether an individual’s sector suffered 
from job losses or not. Table 2, model 5, reports the coefficient of this variable. 
Although the coefficient of the shown model is significant – at least at a generous 
significance level – this relationship cannot be assessed as robust. Slightly different 
operationalizations – e.g., structural change measured in a different year – only 
sometimes lead to significant coefficients.47 In addition, the substantive effect of the 
structural change variable is rather small (in the low 1-digits; not shown). 
                                                 
47 This relationship was tested with a variety of indicators, including: a) different lags, i.e. sectoral 
employment changes between different time-points over the last 5 years or averages thereof; b) different 
functional forms. In particular, the variable was transformed according to Tversky & Kahneman’s (2000: 
57, equation 5) empirically found utility functions, giving losses a greater weight than gains. In addition, 
the variable was recoded into a simple dummy distinguishing between individuals that worked in sectors 
that lost jobs vs. individuals that worked in sectors that did not lose jobs; c) different model 
specifications in order to avoid multi-collinearity; d) at different aggregate levels of the NACE 
classification (1- and 2-digit level, gendered or not); and e) different points of censoring. Please see the 
appendix for more details. 
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Therefore, one can conclude that structural change and the unemployment risks it brings 
about do not have a systematic impact on preferences over redistribution. This is somewhat 
surprising. There are a variety of potential explanations for this null-finding. a) The indicator may 
not be detailed enough. The most detailed available data are at the NACE 2-digit level. But the 
classification itself was developed at the 3-digit level. That means that changes at the most detailed 
(3-digit) level could cancel out on the aggregated 2-digit level. b) It may be that structural change is 
a factor that occurs slowly and has a delayed impact on individual preferences. The data-set does 
not allow for looking at long-term trends. c) Structural change may systematically covary with other 
factors shaping individual preferences over redistribution. In particular, structural change in OECD 
countries is usually skill biased so that the effect of structural change may be hidden behind the fact 
that unskilled individuals are over-proportionally in favor of redistribution anyway. d) Individuals 
may not care about their sector but about their occupation when it comes to preference formation. 
This seems very plausible because industrial classifications (such as NACE) lump workers, 
secretaries, managers etc. into one group because they work within the same sector. And e), of 
course, the suggested causal mechanism may simply be wrong. 
 
International competition 
There is no robust evidence that individuals working in non-tradable sectors are more in 
favor of redistribution than individuals employed in tradable sectors (table 2, model 6). In addition, 
the substantive effect of this variable is rather small (the probability of agreeing with redistribution 
increases by less than 5% if one simulates a change from employment in a tradable vs. a non-
tradable sector; not shown). Likewise, there is no evidence that a sector’s position in the world 
market, i.e. its comparative advantage or disadvantage systematically influences preferences over 
redistribution of individuals working in that sector.48 
 
This is the most important null-finding of this paper. Given the theoretical sophistication of 
these types of arguments and especially their prominence in the literature it is surprising not to find 
                                                 
48 The following question was also employed as dependent variable: “Please say how much you agree or disagree with 
the following statements: All countries benefit if people can move to countries where their skills are most needed” 
(variable “ctbfsmv”). This is the best operationalization of ‘preferences over trade’ that one can get out of the ESS data-
set. Although there are clearly a variety of problems with this dependent variable, one can argue that it taps the 
underlying concept (trade preferences) reasonably well. Even on this dependent variable, there is no empirical support 
for the conjecture that sectoral employment plays a systematic role in shaping individual preferences. 
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any individual level empirical evidence supporting them. In order to understand this null-finding, 
one can make similar arguments as have been made above for explaining the absence of empirical 
support for the structural change hypothesis. If one recalls the sophistication of the arguments 
connecting international competitiveness and individual preferences brought forward in the 
literature, one can argue that the null-finding simply indicates that the suggested logic is wrong. It is 
a big leap of faith to assume that individuals without economics training understand the subtleties of 
trade-theories and their implications for job security. The micro-logic of these arguments seems to 
be too sophisticated to be actually at work.49 
 
Specific Skills 
Recall that it was hypothesized that individuals with specific skills are more in favor of 
income redistribution than people with general skills. Because of the way skill specificity is 
measured (see appendix), the control variable ‘education’ has to be excluded from the regression. In 
line with the findings in Iversen & Soskice (2001), this paper finds that skill specificity is a 
statistically significant, substantively influential and robust determinant of individual level 
preferences over redistribution. Table 2, model 7, shows that individuals endowed with specific 
skills over-proportionally favor income redistribution. The impact of skill specificity on support for 
income redistribution is not only significant (and robustly so, see appendix50), but also substantial 
(see graph 5). Simulating a change from the lowest to the highest degree of skill specificity changes 
the probability of being in favor of income redistribution by roughly 18%. The magnitude of this 
substantive effect is comparable to the effect of income or education. 
                                                 
49 These findings do not imply that the suggested relationship between redistributional preferences and public vs. private 
employment have no empirical support. The data-set does not allow for testing this hypothesis. 
50 The results do not depend on which of the three skill specificity measures is employed. Also, the relationship holds if 
one excludes individuals not in the labor force. However, the inclusion of education as an independent variable makes 
the relationship less robust. But there are excellent reasons not to do so: the operationalization of skill specificity 
already controls for education. 
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GRAPH 5: Substantive effect of skill specificity on preference for redistribution, by gender 
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Disadvantaged occupations 
The conjecture was that individuals exposed to a high risk of unemployment feel insecure 
and demand redistribution as insurance. This paper employs occupational unemployment rates in 
order to measure individual level risk. This operationalization fits the underlying concept quite well. 
There is good evidence that risk – measured by detailed occupational unemployment rates – indeed 
shapes preferences over redistribution. Table 2 (models 8 to 11) shows the estimation results with 
different control variables. The variable of interest – detailed occupational unemployment rates as 
an average from 1999 to 2001 – is significant and has the correct sign.51 The substantive effect of 
‘risk of unemployment’ on preferences is large, especially once education and / or income are 
excluded from the equations. A simulated change from the lowest level of unemployment risk to the 
highest increases the probability of being in favor of redistribution by up to 18% (see graph 6, solid 
line).52  
                                                 
51 Once the multi-collinear variable education is excluded, this finding is very robust. The correlation coefficients 
between educational level and risk of unemployment as well as between income and risk of unemployment are -0.28. 
52 Simulations on estimations that include income and educational level as control variables shrink this probability to 
7% (graph 7, dotted line). Because they are multi-collinear, there are excellent reasons to exclude them.  
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GRAPH 6: Substantive effect of occupational unemployment rates on preference for redistribution 
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In sum, this paper shows that some of the factors measuring individual exposure to risk of 
job loss indeed shape individual preferences over redistribution in a meaningful way. More 
concretely, it can be shown that individuals with specific skills as well as individuals employed in 
disadvantaged occupations (measured with occupational unemployment rates) are over-
proportionally in favor of income redistribution. In contrast, structural change as well as exposure to 
international trade cannot be established as important determinants of individual support for 
redistribution. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
This paper suggests that there are two logics that influence preferences over redistribution. They 
are both important. First, individuals support redistribution because they are disadvantaged and 
hope to directly gain from income redistribution. This is the ‘desire for equity’ logic. Redistribution 
is a means of achieving equity. Income is the most important variable capturing this logic. Second, 
the ‘redistribution-as-insurance’ argument states that individuals are in favor of income 
redistribution because it insures them against the risks of income shocks, regardless of their income-
level.  
 
The paper explores the empirical utility of both logics, but focuses on the redistribution-as-
insurance argument. By drawing on existing theories, the paper formulates hypotheses related to the 
redistribution-as-insurance argument. Structural change, international competitiveness, skill 
specificity and disadvantaged occupations are identified as potential determinants of individual 
preferences over redistribution. The paper brings forward a variety of novel measures to 
operationalize these concepts. Most importantly, it offers a measure of detailed occupational 
unemployment rates derived from labor force surveys. This measure distinguishes over 100 
unemployment rates per country. 
 
In order to evaluate the empirical utility of the redistribution-as-insurance logic, the paper tests 
the derived hypotheses, controlling for the redistribution as equity argument. Three criteria are 
considered in evaluating a variable’s impact on preferences over income redistribution: a 
coefficient’s statistical significance, its substantive effect, and its robustness. When using these 
criteria, the paper can establish that two factors measuring risk importantly influence 
redistributional preferences: skill specificity and occupational unemployment risk. Individuals with 
specific skills as well as individuals in occupations with high unemployment risks are over-
proportionally in favor of income redistribution. In contrast, the paper does not find empirical 
support for the conjecture that risks brought by an individual’s sectoral employment determines 
preferences over redistribution. Neither structural change measured at the sectoral level nor a 
sector’s position in the world-markets – measured by its comparative (dis)advantage – can be 
established as predictors of preferences over income redistribution. These findings suggest that the 
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redistribution-as-insurance model has a certain degree of empirical utility. On the other hand, the 
null-finding on the international competitiveness variables raises questions about the sophisticated 
micro-logic suggested by the trade literature. 
 
This paper focused on the redistribution-as-insurance logic of preference formation. Further 
work exploring this logic is needed. In particular, it seems fruitful to consider more factors that 
threaten an individual’s income. Future work should not only control for the redistribution for 
equity argument – as in this paper – but explore it in detail. The sociological literature is a rich 
source for identifying factors that systematically determine life-chances (mainly class). Although 
this paper systematically controls for income as a crucial measure of the ‘redistribution for equity’ 
argument, a more systematic treatment of this logic would facilitate a comparison with the 
‘redistribution-as-insurance’ argument. 
 
Future work could also systematically consider contextual effects. In addition, exploring the 
determinants of redistributional preferences can serve as a building block for more fine-grained 
explorations of partisan preferences. Which socio-economic factors and preferences determine 
partisan preferences is an important question. As it stands, comparative attitudinal research is far 
from being able to offer conclusive findings. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Structural change 
From EU labor force data, the percentages of people employed within each NACE (Revision 
1) 2-digit group were calculated, by country53 and gender. From the percentages and OECD data on 
(female, male54) civilian employment, the absolute number of people employed at NACE 2-digit 
were computed, for each year (maximum number of years: 1992 to 2003). Straightforwardly, in 
order to calculate percentage changes in employment for each sector (j, at NACE, 2-digit55) within 
each country (k), the following formula was used (t is a time-index56): 
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changepercentage  
 
A negative number implies that a sector within one country lost jobs. A positive number implies 
that a sector did not lose job, and potentially gained jobs.57 
 
In order to correct for implausible outliers, data were censored at -17% and +30% (these are 
the values approximately below the 5th fifth and above the 95th percentile, respectively).58 For 
robustness, two other specifications were employed, with very similar results: a) a dummy that 
equals one for individuals in industries that lost jobs and b) a non-linear transformation, as 
suggested by Tversky & Kahneman (2000: 57, equation 3). This transformation captures 
empirically observed values of individual utility functions and be expressed as: 
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xv , where “x” is the percentage change in sectoral employment. 
 
International competition 
A sector’s comparative advantage or disadvantage was computed as in Mayda & Rodrik 
(2002: pp. 20), but with different data. A sector’s revealed comparative (dis)advantage can be 
determined by looking at the sign of adjusted net exports in that sector (for various years or 
averages over several years). Simply put, a sector is said to have a comparative advantage if its 
exports (X) are greater than its imports (M), adjusted for a countries overall trade (im)balance. 
 
The adjustment factor λ is calculated as:  
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j
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j
j
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XM
λ , 
                                                 
53 Belgium is missing. 
54 Changes were computed by gender as well as for totals. The regression results are the same. 
55 For robustness checks, these values were also computed at NACE, 1-digit. The estimation results are not influenced 
by the variable’s detail. 
56 Different time-differences do not lead to different findings. 
57 Without further information (e.g., wage data), it is not clear whether a positive number simply implies whether the 
sector actually grew or whether the existing jobs were taken over by other workers (usually in order to replace older 
workers). 
58 Other censoring points do not lead to different findings. 
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where the subscript “j” stands for the countries’ sectors. The adjustment factor serves the purpose of 
correcting for the existence of overall trade imbalances. The indicator λ is positive (negative) for 
countries that have a trade deficit (surplus). “In particular, λ tells us by what fraction imports in 
each sector would have to be reduced in order to balance the trade account” (Mayda & Rodrik 
2002). A sector, then, has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) if the following expression is 
smaller (greater) than zero: 
 Comparative (dis)advantage: { }jkjk XMsign −− )1( λ , 
where the subscript “j” stands for sectors and “k” for the different countries. 
 
The ESS data-set contains a variable which assigns each respondent a two-digit NACE 
(Revision 1) code. Since there are no trade-data according to the NACE-classification, this paper 
exploits the relationship between NACE Revision 1 and ISIC Revision 3 (they are essentially the 
same).59 The latter is related to the “Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 1996 
(HS 1996)”, which is used in OECD’s “International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS).” This 
database is “a unique and reliable source of yearly statistical data in imports and exports in OECD 
countries” (OECD about OECD data). It provides very detailed data on values and quantities im- 
and exported, at the 6-digit HS 1996 level.60 The 6-digit (HS 1996) codes were mapped onto the 2-
digit codes in the ESS data-set (NACE, Revision 1). The non-tradable category is a residual 
category: if as sector neither has a comparative advantage nor a disadvantage, it does not trade.61 
Usually, the following sectors are coded as non-tradable: 37, 41-73, 75-91, 95, 99.62 
 
Specific Skills 
The operationalization of skill specificity follows essentially Iversen & Soskice (2001). 
There is one difference, however: instead of calculating the “LFS-shares” (see below) with survey 
data, EU labor force data were used instead. 
 
There are three skill specificity measures: s1, s2, and s_comp. The details of their 
operationalization are: 
 
levelskill
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s
)21(
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1
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s
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2
1
2
+
= ; 2
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59 All trade concordance tables are taken from Eurostat’s Classification Server, called RAMON ( 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/cgi/SimWWWFrame.SimBottomFrame?p_nID=&p_lId=1&p_pId=&p_langn
om=&p_frameType=1&p_asso=&p_emp=&p_language=EN). 
60 Code 1509, e.g., contains “Olive oil and its fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemically modified” – and this 
is only the 4-digit level! 
61 There is no case in which the calculation of a sector’s comparative (dis)advantage returns a zero. 
62 Recycling (37), Collection, purification, and distribution of water (41), Construction (45), Wholesale and retail trade; 
repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods (50-52), Hotels and restaurants (55), Transport, 
storage and communication (60-64), Financial intermediation (65-67), Real estate, renting and business activities (70-
73, not 74 (other business activities)), Public administration and defense; compulsory social security (75), Education 
(80), Health and social work (85), Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities (90), Activities of 
membership organizations n.e.c. (91), Private households with employed persons (95), Extra-territorial organizations 
and bodies (99). 
Some countries, however, have a few more non-tradable sectors because they do not trade every good. 
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where: 
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and “skill level” is the ILO coding for each ISCO88, 1-digit skill level63 and “educational level” is 
the education variable described below.64 
 
Finally, the s1, s2, and s_comp measures are divided by their standard deviations. 
 
Disadvantaged occupations 
In order to compute detailed occupational unemployment rates, the paper exploits EU labor 
force surveys. First, it was calculated how many percent of all classified people were employed and 
unemployed, at ISCO88, 3-digit, by country.65 These percentages were, second, used for computing 
the absolute number of people employed and unemployed, taking standardized OECD civilian 
(un)employment data. Then, the following formula was used to derive the unemployment rate at 
ISCO88, 3-digit (j) within each country (k): 
 
100∗+= jkjk
jk
jk employedofnumberunemployedofnumber
unemployedofnumber
ratentunemployme  
 
This was done for several years (maximum number of years: 1992-2003). For robustness tests, 
unemployment rates at ISCO88, 2-digit and 1-digit were also computed and employed in the 
estimations. The latter could also be computed by gender. The results for all variables are very 
similar. 
 
                                                 
63 ISCO88-1d category “1” does not have a skill level assignment from the ILO. The highest skill level (4) was assigned 
to it. 
64 In order to avoid divisions by zero, the scale of the educational variable was shifted up by one (1). 
65 France and the Netherlands are missing. 
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Other variables 
 
All other variables were taken from inside the ESS data-set. Their operationalization is as 
follows: 
• Preferences for redistribution (five-categories for ordered probit estimations. From low (1 = 
disagreement with income redistribution) to high (5=agreement with income redistribution)). 
Taken from “gincdif”, scale reversed. 
• Preferences for redistribution (dummy variable equals one (1) if individual agrees or strongly 
agrees with income redistribution, zero (0) otherwise, for probit estimations). Taken from 
“gincdif”, recoded. 
• Age (in years).  Taken from “yrbrn” (age=(2003-yrbrn)+1). People younger than 15 and older 
than 99 were coded as missing. 
• Gender (dummy variable equals one (1) if female, zero (0) otherwise). Taken from “gndr.” 
• Income (household income in 12 groups, from lowest to highest). Taken from “hinctnt”. 
• Income above mean income (dummy variable equals one (1) if income above country mean 
income, zero (0) otherwise). Computed from ‘income’ (see above). 
• Transfer dependence (dummy variable equals one (1) if main source of household income is 
transfer payments, zero (0) otherwise). Taken from “hincsrc” (transfer dependent if main source 
of income equals 3 (“pensions”), 4 (“unemployment / redundancy benefit”), or 5 (“any other 
social benefits or grants”)). For robustness tests, each of these three categories was also coded 
into separate dummy variables. 
• Education (highest level, in 7 categories from low (0) to high (6)). Taken from “edulvl.” 
• Self-employment (dummy variable equals one (1) if self-employed, zero (0) otherwise). Taken 
from “empl” (self-employed if empl equals 2 (“self-employed”)). 
• Unemployment, searching for job (dummy variable equals one (1) if unemployed and searching 
for job, zero (0) otherwise). Taken from “uempla” (unemployed, searching for job if uempla 
equals 1 (“Doing last 7 days: unemployed, actively looking for job”)). 
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